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F OR YEARS, physicians and other interested groups
have protested the lack of adequate medical equipment
for use in medical emergencies aboard commercial air-
lines.' Although many passenger illnesses do not require
sophisticated emergency medical equipment or diversion
of flights, other illnesses, such as cardiac arrests and
seizures, clearly call for prompt assistance from qualified
personnel as well as the availability of medical equipment.
Unfortunately, in the past airline personnel or physicians
aboard flights could not render assistance adequately dur-
ing many serious in-flight medical emergencies because
the air carriers carried only elementary first-aid kits.2
It is primarily these life-threatening situations that the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) addressed in
adopting a recent amendment to the Federal Aviation
Regulations. 3 The amendment requires air carrier certifi-
cate holders4 to carry an emergency medical kit aboard
For a discussion of the physicians' concerns, see infra notes 73-85 and accom-
panying text.
2 See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
-, See 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.309(d) (requiring specified emergency medical kits),
121.417(b)(3)(iv) (requiring emergency training, including instruction for han-
dling emergencies involving injures and illnesses and familiarization with the
emergency medical kit), 121.715 (requiring reports on in-flight emergencies), 121
App. A (requirements and specifications for emergency medical kits) (1988).
The amendment applies to certificate holders operating under Part 121 of the
FAA regulations. See 14 C.F.R. § 121.1(a)-(f) (1988).
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passenger aircraft and to report any medical emergencies
annually for two years after the effective date of the rule
(August 1, 1986). 5 The emergency medical kit will enable
physicians who may be aboard flights to more effectively
diagnose and treat persons in need of emergency medical
care during the flight.
This Comment will address the issue of an airline's duty
in handling in-flight medical emergencies.6 In lawsuits
brought by passengers experiencing in-flight medical ill-
nesses, courts have recognized a cause of action based on
allegations of an airline's breach of its duty to provide
either a reasonable,7 high8 or highest degree 9 of care for
the safety of its passengers. Thus, the Comment discusses
cases recognizing such a cause of action and the implica-
tions of the courts' holdings.
Further, the Comment discusses the perceived concern
for the necessity of additional equipment and medications
for use in in-flight medical emergencies,' 0 the issues ad-
dressed by the FAA when issuing the new regulation,"
and the specific requirements of the final emergency med-
ical kit rule. ' 2 Moreover, the Comment summarizes the re-
sults of the first annual reports of in-flight medical
emergencies and makes suggestions for improvements in
both the kit and in training requirements.1 3 Also ad-
dressed are issues not resolved by the FAA regulation, in-
cluding good samaritan protection,' 4 permitted users of
the kits,' 5 the adequacy of crewmember training,' 6 and
the adequacy of the medication and equipment included
See 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.309(d), 121.715, 121 app. A (1988).
See infra notes 19-67 and accompanying text.
7 See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 86-138 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 139-148 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 155-168 and accompanying text.
,4 See infra notes 169-185 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.
"1 See infra notes 188-208 and accompanying text.
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in the kit.1 7 Finally, this Article addresses the issue of
whether the new requirement for emergency medical
equipment will expand or reduce an airline's potential lia-
bility for its conduct in handling in-flight medical
emergencies. 8
II. AN AIRLINE'S DuTY IN IN-FLIGHT MEDICAL
EMERGENCIES
A. General Duty to Exercise High or Highest Degree of Care
While air carriers are not insurers of the safety of their
passengers, 9 as common carriers they are generally held
to be under a duty to exercise either a high degree 20 or
the highest degree of care to safekeep them.2 ' Some
17 See infra notes 208-209 and accompanying text.
- See infra notes 212-240 and accompanying text.
- See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Gibson, 550 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977). The court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff who fell while descend-
ing an escalator on the airline's concourse. Id. at 314. The court noted that while
an airline "is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers," it must exercise a
"high degree of care." Id. at 312. In Rathvon v. Columbia Pac. Airline, 30 Wash.
App. 193, 633 P.2d 122 (1981), the court held that the defendant airline, as a
common carrier, had a duty to exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of
its passengers, but that the airline was not an insurer of a passenger's safety. Id. at
193, 633 P.2d at 129.
21 See, e.g., Morena v. South Hills Health Sys., 462 A.2d 680 (Pa. 1983), where
the court stated that "[e]ven under the high degree of care required of a common
carrier, it is incumbent upon a moving party to establish the requisite knowledge
on the part of the carrier before a breach of duty can be found." Id. at 684. The
Morena case involved allegations of negligence against an ambulance service. Id.
at 682; see also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Gibson, 550 S.W.2d at 313 (where the court
found that Delta did exercise care for the safety of the passenger when assisting
her from the plane to the concourse, but the evidence supported the jury findings
that it did not exercise a high degree of care at the time of the injury and was
negligent).
21 See, e.g., Sprayregen v. American Airlines, 570 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
The plaintiff alleged that the airline breached its duty to warn passengers suffer-
ing from head colds of the risks of losing their hearing. Id. at 17. The court noted
that "it is widely established that a common carrier for hire owes its passengers
the duty of exercising the highest degree of care for their safety." Id. The court
concluded, however, that it would be unreasonable to require the airline "to warn
of hazards that vary according to the particular condition of the passenger." Id. at
18; see also Fleming v. Delta Airlines, 359 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (The court
stated that "common carriers owe their passengers the highest degree of care,"
noting that under federal law there is a "duty resting upon air carriers to perform
their services with the highest possible degree of safety." Id. at 341. (citations
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courts, however, appear to require airlines to exercise
only reasonable care for their passengers' safety. 2
B. Cases Involving In-Flight Medical Emergencies
Although no court has specifically held that an airline
must provide sophisticated medical care to passengers,
some have stated that airlines do have a duty to assist pas-
sengers in medical emergencies.2 3 Courts have recog-
nized a cause of action under a host of allegations,
including claims that 1) the airline refused to aid a passen-
ger suffering a heart attack during a flight,24 2) the air-
line's negligent conduct aggravated a passenger's pre-
existing hiatal hernia,25 3) the airline failed to use care to
omitted). The court concluded that Delta was negligent in failing to warn the
passenger plaintiff "of serious weather disturbances of which it had advance no-
tice." Id. Thus the court allowed the plaintiff to recover damages for the pain
and suffering from angina pectoris experienced during the flight. Id. at 342. Sim-
ilarly, in Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d I (Alaska 1978), a wrong-
ful death action arising out of a plane crash, the court held that the lower court's
"duty of due care instruction [was] inadequate with respect to common carriers
transporting passengers for hire." Id. at 5. Rather, "[ajirline passengers are...
entitled to assume that highest degree of care is being taken [by the common
carrier] for their safety." Id.
2- See, e.g., Fischer v. Northwest Airlines, 623 F. Supp. 1064, 1066 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (complaint which alleged airline breached common-law duty to exercise
reasonable care to its passengers when it failed to aid passenger suffering heart
attack during flight stated negligence claim upon which relief could be granted);
O'Leary v. American Airlines, 100 A.D.2d 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288 (App. Div.
1984) (airline had duty to exercise reasonable care for passenger's safety "in
keeping with the dangers and risks known to the carrier or which it should reason-
ably have anticipated").
23 See infra notes 24-67 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Fischer v. Northwest Airlines, 623 F. Supp. 1064, 1066 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (complaint sets forth negligence action alleging breach of common law duty
to exercise reasonable care to passengers when failing to aid decedent suffering
heart attack during flight); Northern Trust Co. v. American Airlines, 142 Ill. App.
3d 21, 491 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1985) (inapplicability of Warsaw Convention does
not preclude plaintiffs from bringing cause of action against air carrier under
traditional common law rules for alleged negligence when decedent suffered heart
attack while a passenger on international flight). For further discussion of Fischer,
see infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text. For further discussion of Vorthern
Trust Co., see infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
'-. See Abramson v. Japan Airlines, 739 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1984) (the plain-
tiff alleged negligence and willful misconduct based on the airline attendant's fail-
ure to provide him a place to lie down and administer "self-help" remedy), cert.
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alleviate a passenger's ear pain, 6 4) the airline failed to
exercise reasonable care for the safety of an intoxicated
passenger who died from asphyxiation after choking on a
piece of food, 27 and 5) the airline failed to provide ade-
quate medical care and attention to a passenger in
shock. 8
For example, in Fischer v. Northwest Airlines, 9 William
Hawley, a passenger on Northwest's nonstop flight from
Chicago to Seoul, Korea, suffered a severe heart attack
during the flight and died shortly thereafter. 30 The pas-
senger's personal representative sued Northwest alleging
causes of action under Article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion3 ' and common law negligence.32 After finding the
Warsaw Convention claim inapplicable, 33 the court al-
denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985). For further discussion of Abramson, see infra notes
41-44 and accompanying text.
26 See American Airlines v. Marchant, 249 F.2d 612 (1st Cir. 1957) (per curiam);
see infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Marchant.
,7 See O'Leary v. American Airlines, 100 A.D.2d 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d 285, 287
(App. Div. 1984). The plaintiff alleged that the passenger's death "resulted from
asphyxiation when he choked on a piece of food while in an intoxicated state,"
that the airline's negligence proximately caused the death when it permitted him
to board while intoxicated, continued to serve him liquor and food, and "failed to
provide adequate emergency medical treatment." Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
For further discussion of O'Leary, see infra notes 58-61 and 216-220 and accompa-
nying text.
29 See D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways, 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
The court affirmed the jury's finding in favor of defendant in plaintiff's state law
claim against the airline. Id. at 496. For further discussion of D'Aleman, see infra
notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
623 F. Supp. 1064 (N.D. I11. 1985).
O Id.
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.T.N.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter War-
saw Convention]. The Warsaw Convention makes international carriers liable for
injuries sustained by a passenger "if the accident which caused the damage ...
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of em-
barking or disembarking." Id.
-2 Fischer, 623 F. Supp. at 1064.
. Id. at 1065. The Fischer court found that Hawley's ill health "was an internal
disability and was not the result of an unusual or unexpected occurrence con-
nected with the flight." Id. The court based its decision on the United States
Supreme Court's definition of "accident" in Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392
(1985). In Saks, the Court concluded that "liability under Article 17 of the War-
saw Convention arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or
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lowed plaintiffs negligence action to go forward.14 Ac-
cording to the court, the plaintiff's allegation that the
airline breached its common law duty to exercise reason-
able care to its passengers clearly stated a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 5 Specifically, the court
noted that a fact finder might conclude that Northwest ac-
ted unreasonably in not landing at the nearest available
airport, that the aircraft lacked adequate medical equip-
ment, or that the airline negligently failed to seek medical
assistance from ground personnel. 6
Similarly, in Northern Trust v. American Airlines,37 a pas-
senger on American's flight from Acapulco, Mexico, to
Chicago, died after suffering congestive heart failure dur-
unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger." Id. at 405. The
Fischer court held that "no accident caused Hawley's injury" and Northwest was
therefore not liable under the Warsaw Convention. 623 F. Supp. at 1065. The
Fischer court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the airline's refusal to aid
Hawley after his heart attack was an "accident" causing his injuries. Id. In Saks,
the plaintiff, Valerie Saks, traveled on an Air France jet for a 12-hour flight from
Paris to Los Angeles. As the plane descended to Los Angeles, Saks experienced
severe pain and pressure in her left ear. Several days later, a physician deter-
mined that "she had become permanently deaf in her left ear." Saks, 470 U.S. at
394. Saks sued Air France in California state court alleging negligent mainte-
nance and operation of the airplane's pressurization system. The evidence pro-
duced in discovery revealed that the pressurization system had operated normally
o9 the date of the occurrence. After the case was removed to Federal district
court, Air France filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the plaintiff's
injury was not caused by an "accident" within the meaning of the Warsaw Con-
vention. The district court granted summary judgment to Air France, but the
court of appeals reversed, interpreting the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal
Agreement as imposing "absolute liability on airlines for injuries proximately
caused by the risks inherent in air travel." Id. at 395-96. The Supreme Court
disagreed and concluded that "liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual
event or happening that is external to the passenger." Id. at 405. The Court
further stated that "when the injury indisputably results from the passenger's own
internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft, it
has not been caused by an accident, and Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention
cannot apply." Id. at 406.
Fischer, 623 F. Supp. at 1066.
I ld. Accordingly, the court denied Northwest's motion to dismiss plaintiff's
negligence claim and dismissed the Warsaw Convention claims "for failure to al-
lege facts sufficient to establish that an 'accident' caused Hawley's heart attack."
Id.
.,.; Id.
:142 111. App. 3d 21, 491 N.E.2d 417 (1985).
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ing the flight.3 8 Here, as in Fischer, the court denied plain-
tiffs claim under the Warsaw Convention,39 but held that
the plaintiffs were not precluded from asserting their claim
of negligence against the airline under traditional com-
mon law.40
Again, in Abramson v. Japan Airlines,4 the plaintiff suf-
fered an attack from a pre-existing hiatal hernia while on
the defendant's flight from New York to Tokyo, Japan.42
The plaintiff claimed that the negligent conduct of the air-
line and its employees aggravated his hiatal hernia. He
also alleged willful misconduct, which, if proved, would
entitle him to punitive damages.4 3 The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal
of the plaintiff's additional claim under the Warsaw Con-
vention but held that the lower court erred in failing to
reach the negligence and willful misconduct claims.44
- Id. at 21, 491 N.E.2d at 419.
- Id. at 21, 491 N.E.2d at 422. The court found that the passenger's ill-health
(heart condition) was an "inherent weakness or disability and was not the result of
an unusual or unexpected happening... connected with the flight." Id. at 21,491
N.E.2d at 422. Thus, no "accident" occurred under the Warsaw Convention. Id.
at 21, 491 N.E.2d at 422.
44 Id. at 21, 491 N.E.2d at 423. In the trial court, the jury found Nardi 60%
contributorily negligent and awarded plaintiffs $1,030,212 in damages. The ap-
pellate court reversed and remanded the case because of the trial court's exclu-
sion of evidence concerning Nardi's pre-flight medical condition. The court,
however, did not otherwise question the posture of the case as it went to the jury,
i.e., on the claim that the airline was negligent by failing to remove Nardi from the
plane at a stopover and immediately transporting him to a hospital. Id. at 21, 491
N.E.2d at 422. The court did not articulate the degree of care required of the
airline.
41 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985).
42 Id. at 131. The plaintiff did not inform the airline of his condition before the
flight. Id.
4 Id. The plaintiff also asserted a cause of action under the Warsaw Conven-
tion. Id. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Warsaw claim and
stated, "In the absence of proof of abnormal external factors, aggravation of a
pre-existing injury during the course of a routine and normal flight should not be
considered an 'accident' within the meaning of Article 17." Id. at 133.
4 Id. at 135. The defendant argued "that as a matter of law it had no duty to
provide Abramson with a place to lie down." Id. at 134-35. The court held that
the issue of the airline's duty "as well as the question of whether there [was] a
genuine dispute of material fact with respect to Abramson's state law negligence
and wilful misconduct claims, should be addressed in the first instance by the dis-
trict court." Id. at 135.
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Uniformly, the courts require the airlines to assist an ill
passenger only so long as they are aware or should be
aware of the passenger's condition. For instance, in Amer-
ican Airlines v. Marchant,45 the plaintiff allegedly informed
the stewardess that he was experiencing severe pain in his
ear during the ascent of the defendant's plane.46 The
stewardess, however, did nothing to alleviate the plain-
tiff's condition until after the plaintiff's eardrum had rup-
tured.47 The plaintiff claimed that the airline was
negligent in not correcting the air pressure difference af-
ter being notified of plaintiff's condition and "in failing to
give him reasonable attention. ' 48 In affirming the district
court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit stated that the airline, after re-
ceiving notice of the passenger's condition, had a duty to
''use care" (presumably reasonable care) to alleviate the
passenger's condition.49
By way of contrast, in Sprayregen v. American Airlines,5 ° the
plaintiff, who had a head cold prior to boarding the de-
fendant's aircraft, suffered permanent hearing loss subse-
quent to the flight. 5' The plaintiff alleged that the sudden
pressure change while the flight descended caused his in-
jury.52 He also alleged that the airline had a duty to warn
passengers of the risks of such injuries.5 3 Here, unlike in
Marchant, the plaintiff did not advise the airline of his dis-
4,, 249 F.2d 612 (1st Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
- Id. at 614. The plaintiff testified that he was not aware of any problem with
his ears prior to boarding the flight. Id.
47 Id. The court noted that the evidence indicated that the stewardess could
have assisted the plaintiff by providing an inhalator to equalize the pressure and
relieve the pain in his ears. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that the airline
could have used manual controls to reduce the change in cabin pressure which
would have relieved the plaintiffs condition. Id.
4, Marchant v. American Airlines, 146 F. Supp 612, 614 (D.R.I. 1956), aff'dper
curiam, 249 F.2d 612 (1st Cir. 1957).
- American Airlines v. Marchant, 249 F.2d at 613-14. The court did not indi-
cate the particular degree of care the airline was obligated to exercise.





comfort at any time during the flight.54 After acknowledg-
ing that an air carrier must exercise the highest degree of
care for the safety of its passengers,5 5 the court held that
an airline has no duty to warn its passengers of hazards
that vary according to the particular condition of the pas-
senger.5 6 The court recognized, however, that under
Marchant a different rule might apply if the airline knew of
the passenger's condition, 57 thus implying that the airline
would indeed be obligated to render medical assistance if
aware of a passenger's illness.
In O'Leary v. American Airlines,58 where an intoxicated
passenger died from asphyxiation after choking on a piece
of food, the court did so hold. 59 There, the court held
that the plaintiff's amended complaint sufficiently stated a
cause of action for negligence under the principle that the
common carrier owed a duty to the passenger to exercise
reasonable care for his safety.60 Interestingly, the O'Leary
court stated that the carrier has a further duty to render




Id. at 18. The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
however, stating that material fact questions remained as to whether the airline
acted negligently in some other respect, apart from its failure to warn. Id.
57 Id. The court stated that "a different rule might apply where the airline was
aware of the passenger's peculiar physical or emotional state or of any difficulty or
distress that the passenger suffered during the flight." Id.
100 A.D.2d 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 1984).
Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 288. The amended complaint alleged that the
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of decedent's death,
in that defendant, inter alia, permitted him to board the airplane
while intoxicated, continued to serve him alcoholic beverages and
food, failed to provide adequate emergency medical treatment and
failed to comply with existing [FAA] regulations pertaining to ser-
vice of alcoholic beverages in flight.
Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 287. The court stated that the defendant, as a common
carrier, owed a duty to exercise reasonable care for the decedent's safety "in keep-
ing with the dangers and risks known to the carrier or which it should reasonably
have anticipated." Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 288 (citations omitted).
,11 Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 288. The court concluded that an airline has a
further duty to exercise such "additional care or to render such aid for [a passen-
ger's] safety and welfare as is reasonably required by [his] disability and the ex-
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Understandably, courts clearly recognize that air carri-
ers cannot reasonably anticipate, nor should they be held
absolutely liable, for every in-flight medical emergency.6 2
For example, in D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways,63
the plaintiff alleged that the airline's negligence in operat-
ing the plane and in failing to provide adequate medical
care caused the decedent to go into a state of shock, re-
sulting in his death four days later.64 The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the de-
fendant airline,65 noting that "carriers cannot be responsi-
ble for the individual characteristics of each passenger."66
One may confidently conclude from the foregoing deci-
sions that a plaintiff may maintain a cause of action for
negligence under traditional common law rules when the
airline is alleged to know of a passenger's illness and fails
to render or seek medical assistance or divert the flight.67
Less certain, however, is the level of medical care the air-
line must provide.
III. THE NEW REGULATION REQUIRING EMERGENCY
MEDICAL KITS
The cases discussed above arose when the FAA re-
quired commercial carriers to carry only rudimentary
first-aid kits aboard flights. Some of the medical emer-
gencies involved in the cases might have been prevented
isting circumstances, providing that the carrier's employees know or in the
exercise of reasonable care have reason to know of the passenger's disability." Id.
(citation omitted).
62 See, e.g., D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways, 259 F.2d 493, 494 (2d
Cir. 1958) (airline is not responsible for the individual characteristics of passen-
gers); Delta Air Lines v. Gibson, 550 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (air-
line is not insurer of safety of passengers).
259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
I /d.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 494. The court stated that to hold air carriers responsible for the indi-
vidual characteristics of passengers "would be to impose a duty of a complete
medical and psychiatric examination of all passengers and then to adopt a rule of
absolute liability in the event that any undiscovered condition was aggravated by
some incident of the flight." Id.
- See supra notes 23-66 and accompanying text.
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had the airlines been equipped with more sophisticated
medical equipment. Fortunately, the FAA now requires
that airlines equip passenger aircraft with emergency
medical kits.68 What effect the requirements will have on
an airline's potential liability to its passengers is discussed
in Section IV of this Comment.69
A. The Need for Additional Medical Equipment
Airlines based in the United States transport over 300
million passengers per year. 70 An estimated 100 of these
passengers die during flight, and even more become seri-
ously ill. 7 ' The experience of one major U.S. airline indi-
cated that it diverted flights for an average of one of every
one million passengers due to a life-threatening medical
emergency.72
Surprisingly, physicians are passengers aboard a high
percentage of commercial flights.73 When a medical
- For discussion of the new emergency medical kit requirement, see infra notes
139-148 and accompanying text.
I;!, See infra notes 212-240 and accompanying text.
7" See Bargmann & Wolfe, Airplanes: Medically Underequipped, 304 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1049 (1981) (letter to the editor); Mohler, Nicogossian & Margulies, Emer-
gency Medicine &the Airline Passenger, 51 AVIATION SPACE & ENVTL. MED. 918 (1980).
1, See Bargmann & Wolfe, supra note 70, at 1049; see also Cummins, Chapman,
Chamberlain, Schubach & Litwin, In-flight Deaths During Commercial Travel, 259 J.
A.M.A. 1983 (1988) [hereinafter Litwin]. Based on information reported to the
International Air Transport Association on in-flight deaths on commercial flights
for 1977-84, deaths occurred at average rates of 0.31 per million passengers. Id.
72 Mohler, Nicogossian & Margulies, supra note 70, at 918 (citing Schocken &
Lederer, Unscheduled Landings for Medical Reasons: A Summary of a Five Year Survey of
the Experience of American Airlines, in RECENT ADVANCES IN AEROSPACE MEDICINE 126
(D. Busby ed. 1970)). Meaningful statistics concerning the instances of in-flight
medical emergencies have not previously been available, at least in the United
States. The new amendment to the federal regulation requiring certificate hold-
ers to annually report medical emergencies occurring on flights during a two year
period, see 14 C.F.R. § 121.715 (1988), should prove useful in analyzing the ac-
tual occurrence of such emergencies. For a discussion of this regulation and the
results of the first annual reports, see infra notes 139-168 and accompanying text.
13 See Mills & Harding, Medical Emergencies in the Air (pt. 1), 286 BRIT. MED. J.
1131 (1983) [hereinafter Mills & Harding I]. According to Air France, physicians
are aboard flights in three of every four instances of medical emergencies. Air
Canada estimates that the incidence of physicians being available for in-flight
emergencies may be as high as 90% while other airlines estimate figures of 40%
to 50%. Id.
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emergency occurs, these physicians are called upon to as-
sist voluntarily in diagnosing and treating the sick passen-
ger.14  It is these physicians, as well as nurses, interest
groups, and victims of in-flight medical emergencies, who
have criticized the perceived lack of adequate medical fa-
cilities aboard aircraft and the inadequate emergency
medical training of crewmembers.75
In the past, compilations of reliable statistics of the fre-
quency and cause of in-flight medical emergencies did not
exist. 76 Those statistics that were available consisted of
voluntary reports of several airlines (usually consisting of
flight attendants' reports), 77 analysis of the number of un-
scheduled landings for medical reasons,78 computations
of the number of in-flight deaths,79 and information solic-
74 Goodman, Medical Emergencies During Air Travel, 80 POSTGRADUATE MED. 54
(1986). The pilot and/or crewmembers first seek assistance from any physicians
aboard a flight before making the decision to divert. A physician voluntarily pro-
viding services and advice may save the life of a seriously ill passenger since di-
verting a domestic flight can take up to forty minutes. The physician who
voluntarily aids in diagnosing a passenger may also save an airline the inconven-
ience and expense of an unscheduled landing, since many in-flight illnesses may
not require diversion of flights. Id.
75 See, e.g., Anderson, Emergency Medical Kits to be Required Cargo on Commercial
Airlines. But Will They Fill the Bill?, 256J. A.M.A. 167 (1986) (reciting physicians'
accounts of patients suffering diabetic seizure, cardiorespiratory arrest, and severe
allergic food reaction while aboard aircraft and complaints of lack of adequate
medical equipment); Cockerell, Basic Medical Equipment on Commercial Airlines, 314
NEw ENG.J. MED. 1052 (1986) (letter to the editor) (physician's complaint of lack
of stethoscope and sphygmomanometer and inadequate crewmember training for
patient suffering possible myocardial infarction); Lawrie, Medical Responsibilities of
Airlines, 282 BRIT. MED. J. 320 (1981) ("airlines should . . . review their responsi-
bilities and reactions to the passenger taken ill during flight"); see also Hays, Physi-
cians and Airline Medical Emergencies, 48 AVIATION SPACE & ENVTL. MED. 468 (1977);
Rennie, Medical Hazards of Air Travel, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 515 (1977).
76 See, e.g., Litwin, supra note 71, at 1983; Mills & Harding, supra note 73, at
1131.
77 See Litwin, supra note 71, at 1983; Davies & Degotardi, Inflight Medical Facilties,
53 AVIATION SPACE & ENVTL. MED. 694, 695 (1982); Hays, supra note 75, at 468;
Mohler, Nicogossian & Margulies, supra note 70, at 918.
78 See Davies & Degotardi, supra note 77, at 698 (reporting Qantas experienced
16 diversions during 1975-79; Air France, three diversions in 1975; and American
Airlines, an average of 18 diversions per year for 1964-68); Mohler, Nicogossian &
Margulies, supra note 70, at 918 (estimating one of every one million passengers is
deplaned because of medical emergency).
79 See, e.g., Litwin, supra note 71, at 1983 (reporting 42 carriers experienced av-
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ited from physicians concerned with and involved in such
incidents. 80 Reports of medical incidents have indicated
that the most critical medical problems occurring aboard
aircraft include obstructed airway of the throat, cardiac
problems, trauma, hemorrhage, and hypoxia. 81 Although
the frequency of medical emergencies does not appear to
be alarmingly high,82 those involved in such emergencies
in the past consistently criticized the lack of adequate
medical facilities. 83 Physicians pointed to the use by Euro-
pean airlines of sophisticated medical equipment84 when
criticizing the first-aid kits formerly required on United
States airlines, 85 the contents of which were plainly inade-
erage of 72 deaths per year, or 0.31 per million passengers); Mills & Harding I,
supra note 73, at 1131 (reporting eight deaths for British Airways during 1979-80).
,, See, e.g., Davies & Degotardi, supra note 77, at 694 (analysis of 10 incidents
from 6 physicians); Hays, supra note 75, at 468 (solicitation for physician experi-
ence in medical emergencies resulting in 42 responses and 62 incident reports).
11 See, e.g., Hays, supra note 75, at 469 (physicians interviewed reported cardio-
vascular problems most frequently); Litwin, supra note 71, at 1985 (most fre-
quently reported cause of death related to cardiac problems); Mohler,
Nicogossian & Margulies, supra note 70, at 919 (listing types of medical emergen-
cies encountered on U.S. and European airlines).
.2 See Litwin, supra note 71, at 1983, where the authors compiled information
reported to the International Air Transport Association on deaths occurring dur-
ing commercial flights for the years 1977 through 1984. Id. "Of the 120 airlines
in the International Air Transport Association, 42 carriers reported deaths during
these eight years. A total of 577 in-flight deaths were recorded, for a reported
average of 72 deaths per year. Deaths occurred at average rates of 0.31 per mil-
lion passengers... " Id.; see also AMA Commission on Emergency Medical Serv-
ices, Medical Aspects of Transportation Aboard Commercial Aircraft, 247 J. A.M.A. 1007
(1982) (reporting in-flight death rate for 1976 to 1979 as only one per 6.4 million
passengers).
" See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
84 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 75, at 168 ("Scandinavian Airlines System, Air
France, El Al, and Air Canada already carry emergency medical equipment, in-
cluding drugs to treat asthma, heart problems, and diabetic insulin shock.");
Chapman & Chamberlain, Death in the Clouds, 294 BRIT. MED. J. 181 (1987) (letter
to the editor) (British Caledonian Airways equipment includes a semiautomatic
defibrillator for use by trained flight attendants in cardiac arrests); Mills & Har-
ding, Medical Emergencies in the Air (pt. 2), 286 BRIT. MED.J. 1204 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Mills & Harding II] ("Air France, Alitalia, Iberia, Lufthansa, and Sabena have
equipped their aircraft with kits for use solely by doctors."); Mohler, Nicogossian
& Margulies, supra note 70, at 920 (listing contents of European airlines physi-
cian's kit and flight attendant's kit).
-, See 51 Fed. Reg. 1218 (1986). Prior to the amendment requiring both first-
aid kits and emergency medical kits, the FAA required airlines to carry only first-
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quate for effective treatment of critically ill passengers.
B. The Petition for Rulemaking
As a result of such widespread concern, various interest
groups and individuals formally assessed the problem of
in-flight illnesses and recommended equipment and
drugs suitable for an on-board emergency medical kit.86
In March 1981, Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D., and Eve
Bargmann, M.D., representing the Public Citizen Health
aid kits containing various bandages, leg and arm splints, antiseptic swabs, ammo-
nia inhalants, bandage scissors, and bum compound. Id.
- See, e.g., Mohler, Idealized Inflight Airline Medical Kit, 47 AVIATION SPACE &
ENvrL. MED. 1094 (1976). The Air Transport Medicine Committee of the Aero-
space Medical Association studied the occurrence of in-flight illnesses and recom-
mended drugs and equipment suitable for an ideal medical kit. The Committee
recommended that the kit contain drugs for: (1) cardiovascular emergencies (in-
cluding deslanoside for cardiac failure, atropine for bradycardia, Xylocaine for
cardiac arrhythmia, morphine for infarct pain, nitroglycerin for angina pectoris,
ammonia for vasovagal fainting, and furosemide for pulmonary edema); (2) re-
spiratory emergencies (including aminophylline, Isuprel, and Solu Cortef); (3)
neurological emergencies (including diazepam for agitation, Dramamine for air
sickness, and phenobarbital for convulsions); (4) metabolic emergencies (includ-
ing dextrose for hypoglycemia, insulin for diabetic acidosis, and sodium bicarbo-
nate for acidosis); (5) traumatic injuries (including meperidine hydrochloride and
Talwin, both for pain); (6) gastrointestinal emergencies (including Lomotil, My-
lanta and Donnatal); (7) pregnancy emergencies (ergonovine maleate); and (8)
anaphylactic shock (including epinephrine and Benadryl). Id. at 1095. Recom-
mended medical equipment for flights included a stethoscope, a sphygmomanom-
eter, oral airways, scalpels, an ambu-bag (manual resuscitator), clamps, needles,
and an intubation set. Id. As discussed more fully in infra notes 144-146 and
accompanying text, when promulgating the final emergency medical equipment
rule the FAA compromised and refused to include many drugs and items of
equipment previously recommended by those commenting on the proposed rule.
See also Mohler, Nicogossian & Margulies, supra note 70, at 920, describing the
first-aid and medical kits then used by such foreign airlines as Air France, Alitalia,
Iberia, Lufthansa, and Sabena. These airlines carry three kits: (1) an emergency
physician's kit for use only by physicians volunteering to assist, (2) a flight attend-
ant's kit for use only by crewmembers having specific training in its use, and (3) a
first-aid kit similar to the U.S. first-aid kit required by the FAA. Id.; see supra note
85 for a list of the contents of the first-aid kit required on U.S. airlines. The Moh-
ler article also called for centralized reporting to the FAA of in-flight illnesses,
more extensive emergency medical training of crewmembers, and additional med-
ical equipment and medications for treatment of common in-flight illnesses.
Mohler, Nicogossian & Margulies, supra note 70, at 922. In addition, see
Bargmann & Wolfe, supra note 70, at 1049, where Sidney Wolfe, M.D. and Eve
Bargmann, M.D., apprised readers of their petition asking the FAA to require U.S.
air carriers to provide emergency medical equipment.
COMMENTS
Research Group of the Aviation Consumer Action Pro-
ject, filed a petition ("Bargmann petition") to amend the
Federal Aviation Regulations "to require air carriers to
provide emergency medical equipment (both medications
and diagnostic and lifesaving equipment) in addition to
the rudimentary first aid kits now required. '87 The peti-
tion cited various reasons for requesting the amendment.
First, the petition stated that an unknown number of
Americans develop serious medical problems while travel-
ling on airplanes and any doctor requested to assist can-
not effectively treat the ill passenger because the plane is
not equipped with lifesaving medical equipment or help-
ful medications.88
The petition noted that many of the 100 passenger
deaths per year reported to the Air Transport Association
might have been prevented if lifesaving equipment were
available. 89 The petition also cited surveys of doctors ex-
pressing concern over the problem. According to a sur-
vey of more than 300 physicians, 88.9% recommended
that airlines be required to carry more medical equipment
and medications aboard their airplanes.90 The survey re-
sults indicated that 20% of the 300 physicians surveyed
had responded to requests for assistance on flights.9"
Many of the responding physicians experienced problems
in treating passengers due to the lack of adequate medica-
87 Summary Notice No. PR-81-12, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,278 (1981) (proposed Aug.
20, 1981). Pursuant to the FAA's rules of practice, "[any interested person may
petition the Administrator to issue, amend, or repeal a rule," 14 C.F.R. § 11.25(a)
(1988), and the FAA is then required to publish a summary of the petition in the
Federal Register. 14 C.F.R. § 11.27(b) (1988).
88 46 Fed. Reg. 42,278 (1981). The petition stated that many of the serious in-
flight medical problems experienced by ill passengers may be life-threatening if
not promptly treated.
Yet any doctor on board who is called to help will find that the plane
carries no lifesaving medical equipment, no medications (other than
burn compound) - not even a stethoscope. As a result, a person
with severe ashtma [sic] or diabetic coma, for example, could die for
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tions or equipment on board.92 The petition further re-
ferred to the reports of physicians in medical journals
relating their experiences in assisting passengers with
heart problems, strokes, gastrointestinal problems, and
diabetic comas without the benefit of adequate equipment
or medications.93
Finally, the petition stated that the implementing of
better medical equipment would be feasible and inexpen-
sive, that two medical groups had published recom-
mended lists of emergency medical equipment for
airlines,94 and that many foreign air carriers (including
Scandinavian Airlines System, Air France, and El Al) al-
ready carry in-flight emergency medical equipment and
medications.9 5
C. The FAA's Initial Denial of Rulemaking
Pursuant to FAA rules of practice,9 6 the FAA published
a summary of the petition in the Federal Register for pub-
lic comment for a proposed rule. 9 7 During the subse-
quent comment period, the FAA received 370 comments,
most supporting the proposed rule.98 Those in favor of
the proposal indicated that the FAA should require
United States airlines to carry emergency medical equip-
ment which would enable crewmembers or medically
qualified persons to assist ill passengers.99 Many physi-
cians related experiences of involvement in in-flight medi-
,: Id.
93~ Id.
1. Id. The petition noted that the American College of Surgeons and the Air
Transport Medicine Committee of the Aerospace Medical Association had pub-
lished recommended lists of emergency medical equipment. Id.; see supra note 86
for discussion of the recommendation of the Air Transport Medicine Committee.
tv, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,278 (1981). For discussion of medical kit requirements of
foreign airlines, see supra note 84.
.. See 14 C.F.R. § 11.27(b) (1988).
117 46 Fed. Reg. 42,278 (1981). Comments on a petition must be filed within 60
days after the summary is published. 14 C.F.R. § 11.27(b) (1988). The Adminis-
trator considers the comments before taking action on the petition. Id.
See 50 Fed. Reg. 10,444 (1985) (proposed Sept. 12, 1985).
I Id.
cal emergencies. 00 Those opposed to the proposal cited
added cost and possible misuse of the equipment or medi-
cations as problems.' 01
After reviewing the Bargmann petition and comments
received, the FAA refused to promulgate a new rule,
10 2
stating that a revised rule would, if adopted, "require air
carriers to provide equipment and medicine to handle
general emergencies not related to flight or shown to affect avi-
ation safety." 10 3 The FAA interpreted its statutory powers
to be limited to requiring only those medical supplies
"necessary for the treatment of ... injuries or illnesses
likely to be caused or induced by flight,"' 10 4 and not for those
which merely "occur" in-flight. 10 5
In response to the FAA's refusal to proceed with the
rulemaking, the original petitioners (Doctors Bargmann
and Wolfe of the Public Citizen Health Research Group of
the Aviation Consumer Action Project), along with other
doctors, health care professionals and airline passengers
requested the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in Bargmann v. Helms'06 to review
the FAA's decision. In doing so, the court reviewed the
issue of whether the FAA indeed lacked statutory author-
ity to promulgate a rule requiring a commercial aircraft to
carry additional medical supplies on commercial air-
craft. 10 7 After deciding it had the power to review the
' Id. "Those emergencies include such conditions as myocardial infarction,
allergic reaction to food, acute asthma, epileptic seizures, and childbirth." Id.
11Id.
See 47 Fed. Reg. 29,688 (1982) (denied May 19, 1982). Pursuant to 14
C.F.R. § 11.27(f) (1988), the FAA published a summary of a denial for a petition
for rulemaking.
Io, See Bargmann v. Helms, 715 F.2d 638, 639-40 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting the
FAA's Denial of Rulemaking).
- Id. at 640 (quoting FAA's Denial of Rulemaking).
Id. at 641.
715 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The petitioners in the case were "forty indi-
vidual doctors, health care professionals, and airline passengers and two non-
profit consumer organizations, Aviation Consumer Action Project (ACAP) and
Public Citizen Health Research Group (HRG)." Id. at 639. The respondents were
J. Lynn Helms (the administrator of the FAA), the FAA, Drew Lewis (the Secretary
of Transportation), and the Department of Transportation. Id. at 638.
,07 Id. at 638. The court stated, "The sole issue presented for review . . . is
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agency's decision and stating the standard of review, 0 8
the court held that the FAA had the statutory authority to
promulgate such a rule "should it deem such action advis-
able on the merits."' 0 9 The court disagreed with the
FAA's contention that the first aid kit requirements were
historically instituted "at the outer limits of the agency's
regulatory authority."" t0 Moreover, the court noted that
the FAA operates under the broad statutory mandate of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 which empowers the
whether the Federal Aviation Administration lacks statutory authority to institute
a rulemaking to upgrade the quality of first-aid kits currently carried on board
commercial aircraft." Id. The FAA contended that it lacked "the power, under its
mandate to regulate 'safety' in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, to require com-
mercial aircraft to carry medical equipment designed to treat health problems that
,occur' in flight but are not 'caused by' flight." Id.
1- Id. at 640-41. The court acknowledged that judicial review of an agency's
decision not to regulate might be improper, for example, when the decision is
made "because of internal management considerations as to budget and person-
nel or for reasons made after a weighing of competing policies." Id. at 640. In
this case, however, the court stated that "the FAA has denied a petition for
rulemaking solely because it believes it lacks the statutory power to act-a ration-
ale that is uniquely well-suited for judicial resolution." Id. The court held that it
had the authority to make an independent inquiry into an agency's allegation that
it lacked statutory authority to act. Id. at 641. In so holding, the court noted that
this was not a case involving an agency's legislative choice, where the reviewing
court would simply determine whether the agency's actions were "arbitrary" or
"irrational." Id.
... Id. at 639. The court concluded:
According to the FAA's rules of practice, this [statutory authority]
requires the Administrator to determine, in light of the public com-
ments received, whether the institution of rulemaking proceedings is
justified by the reasons put forth in the petition. In remanding the
case to the agency, we express no views whatsoever on the merits of
petitioner's request. We hold only that the agency has the power of
decision; the decision itself must be made by the FAA.
Id. at 643 (citation omitted).
.... Id. at 642. The court noted that the first-aid kit rule as originally developed
did not limit the contents of the kits; "the kits were merely required to be
'proper', 6 Fed. Reg. 3,826 (1941), 'adequate', 10 Fed. Reg. 8,529 (1945) or 'suit-
able and sufficient', 14 Fed. Reg. 4,307 (1949)." Id. at 641. In addition, the
agency's subsequent rulemaking concerning required items in the first-aid kits did
not make an "induced or caused by flight" distinction. Id. (construing 14 Fed.
Reg. 7,034 (1949) and 17 Fed. Reg. 2,748 (1952)). Furthermore, the agency's
rulemaking in 1964, 1973, and 1975 indicated that the FAA considered itself to
have the authority to require medical equipment for any type of in-flight medical
emergency. Id. at 641-42.
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FAA to regulate safety."' Accordingly, the court held
that the FAA's "induced by flight" distinction was incon-
sistent with the intent of Congress to grant the FAA ple-
nary authority to "[m]ake and enforce safety regulations
governing the design and operation of civil aircraft," in
order to ensure maximum possible safety." 12 Following
the court's reversal and remand in Bargmann, the FAA re-
considered the petition and the comments received in re-
sponse to the summary of the petition published in the
Federal Register." 13
D. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Upon reconsideration, the FAA issued a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking and recommended additional medical
equipment and medications on passenger flights for use
by qualified persons whom crewmembers request to assist
in the treatment of in-flight medical emergencies.1 14 The
I Id. at 642. The court cited various provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 relating to the power of the Secretary of Transportation, including 49 U.S.C.
§ 1421(a)(6) (1982), which provides:
(a) The Secretary of Transportation is empowered and it shall be his
duty to promote safety of flight in civil aircraft in air commerce by
prescribing and revising from time to time:
(6) Such reasonable rules and regulations, or minimum standards,
governing other practices, methods, and procedures, as the Secre-
tary of Transportation may find necessary to provide adequately for
national security and safety in air commerce.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 142 1(a)(6) (1982). In addition, the FAA
is authorized to issue air carrier operating certificates which "shall presribe such
terms, conditions, and limitations as are reasonably necessary to assure safety in
air transportation." 49 U.S.C. § 1424(b) (1982). The Bargmann court further
noted:
Although we do not interpret the 1958 Act's safety provisions to
constitute a general welfare clause, giving the FAA authority over
virtually all aspects of life on board commercial aircraft, the proper
scope to be given these provisions must comport with the broad lan-
guage in which Congress couched its delegation of authority.
Bargmann, 715 F.2d at 642.
1" Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,7, reprinted in 1958
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 3741-42).
"- For discussion of the petition and comments, see supra notes 87-101 and
accompanying text.
" Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,444 (1985) (proposed Mar.
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FAA notice of proposed rulemaking ("FAA notice") rec-
ommended that each aircraft carry a medical kit contain-
ing equipment and medications to provide basic life
support during medical emergencies such as heart attacks,
acute asthma attacks, allergic reactions, insulin shock,
seizures, and childbirth.' 1 5 In addition, the FAA notice
proposed that each air carrier be required to report annu-
ally, for two years after the implementation of the rule, in-
flight medical emergencies that result in the use of the re-
14, 1985). Notices of proposed rulemaking are published pursuant to 14 C.F.R.
§ 11.29 (1988).
1 50 Fed. Reg. at 10,445. The notice recommended that the medical kit in-






a. Oropharyngeal airways (3 sizes)






4. Syringes and needles (those necessary to administer required drugs)
5. Intravenous administration set
6. Drugs, parenteral













g. Drug for hypoglycemic shock: 50% dextrose injection
h. Intravenous fluid for drug administration: 5% dextrose injection
250cc
7. Drug for oral administration:
Antianginal: Nitroglycerine, sublingual
8. Basic instructions for use of the drugs in the kit
COMMENTS
quired emergency medical kit, diversion of the aircraft, or
the death of a passenger or crewmember. 116
The FAA notice invited interested persons to comment
upon the proposed rule. 1 7 The FAA received approxi-
mately 140 public comments in response to the notice. In
contrast to the comments received in response to the
Bargmann petition, 1 8 which were primarily from individ-
uals, the responses to the FAA notice were mainly from
organizations, including several medical associations, air
carrier associations, labor organizations, and air carrier
certificate holders." 9 Forty-six individual physicians also
sent comments, forty-four of whom supported the notion
of an expanded medical kit.' 20
The physicians' opinions varied as to what the medical
kits should contain. Some physicians, concerned that a
few of the proposed drugs would be misused, recom-
mended that such drugs be deleted. 12  Others recom-
mended that the kits contain more extensive drugs and
equipment. 22 One physician objected because the pres-
ence of such equipment could result in a tendency "to try
to make do with the available equipment," consequently
delaying immediate diversion of flights. 2 3 Another physi-
cian opposed any equipment and drugs other than a steth-
oscope and a blood pressure recording cuff, because of
the potential for misuse. 124 Some physicians, as well as
nurses, expressed their belief that "good samaritan" pro-
tection from liability was necessary to ensure that physi-
Id.
117 Id. at 10,444.
- See 46 Fed. Reg. 42,278 (1981).
See 51 Fed. Reg. 1218 (1986).
Id. at 1218-19. Of the seven registered nurses commenting on the notice of
proposed rulemaking, five favored medical kits and two opposed them based on
possible misuse. Id. at 1219. Two nurses recommended that a registered nurse
be included as a crewmember on flights. Id. The FAA also received comments
from many "non-medical" individuals. Their comments generally favored the
proposed kit. Id.
121 Id. at 1218.
122 Id.
12:4 Id. at 1219.
14Id.
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cians and nurses come forward during medical
emergencies. 1 2 5
Not surprisingly, providers of medical equipment and
consultant services favored the expanded medical kit. 126
The National Transportation Safety Board also favored
the proposed kit.127 Air carrier labor organizations gener-
ally favored the proposed kits. Although favoring the
medical kit, the Airline Pilots Association additionally ad-
vocated the need for good samaritan legislation. 28 The
Airline Operations Control Society objected to the kit
proposal, voicing concerns of potential misuse of the
equipment and drugs by unqualified individuals. 29 The
flight attendant unions favored the proposal and recom-
mended an additional "expanded first-aid kit" for use by
flight attendants. 3 0
Small air carriers objected to the proposal, primarily
because of the short duration of their flights and the low
probability of a person qualified to use the kit being on
board such flights.' 3 ' Three air carrier associations, the
Air Transport Association (ATA), the Regional Airline
Association (RAA), and the National Air Carrier Associa-
tion, Inc. (NACA) opposed the FAA's proposed rule.13 2
The ATA, representing the major domestic air carriers,
,'n, Id. In response to the concern for "good samaritan" legislation, the FAA
pointed out that existing state "good samaritan" laws may apply. Furthermore,
the FAA opined that qualified medical personnel will nevertheless continue to
assist voluntarily in medical emergencies, and that the absence of federal legisla-
tion did not justify withdrawal of the proposed rule. The FAA also noted that
Congress had been considering "good samaritan" legislation. Id. at 1221; see infra
notes 169-185 and accompanying text for further discussion of "good samaritan"
laws.
12.. 51 Fed. Reg. 1218, 1219 (1986).




Id. The probability of an individual qualified to use the kit being on board is
not as high on small carriers as it is on large carriers using larger aircraft and
making longer flights. Id.
1:1- Id.
cited the American Medical Association's 1981 study133 to
support its belief that the first-aid kits were satisfactory.
The ATA's concerns included who could use the kit, lia-
bility for use of the kit, security of the medications and
dangerous instruments, the Drug Enforcement Agency's
regulation of controlled substances, and potential for mis-
use of the kit. 134 The ATA concluded by recommending
that the FAA analyze the results of the proposed two-year
reports before requiring airlines to carry emergency med-
ical kits.' 5 The RAA, representing "short haul" regional
and commuter carriers, objected to the FAA's proposed
rule because the short flights make diversion possible,
and the aircraft are never more than 30 minutes from an
airport where qualified medical assistance is available.
Both the RAA and the NACA raised issues of "liability,
security, potential for misuse, accountability for con-
trolled substances, and need for a physician in order to
procure the proposed drugs in the kit."'' 3 6
Seven physicians' associations and two nurses' associa-
tions responded with comments ranging from full support
to total opposition.' 3 7 The primary reasons for opposi-
tion by these groups concerned the need for good samari-
tan legislation and the fear of possible misuse of the
equipment and drugs. 38
E. Final Emergency Medical Kit Requirement
After considering the comments on both the Bargmann
-:1 Id.; see AMA Commission on Emergency Medical Services, supra note 82, at
1007.
1:,4 See 51 Fed. Reg. 1218, 1219.
,:15 Id. at 1219.
-,; Id. at 1220.
"37 Id. The AMA, for example, cited its 1981 study, AMA Commission On
Emergency Medical Services, supra note 82, and pointed to its other activity in the
area, including its recommendations to physicians travelling by air to carry per-
sonal medical kits, and its support for federal "good samaritan" legislation. 51
Fed. Reg. 1218, 1220. The nurses' associations questioned how crewmembers
will identify a qualified user of the kit. Id. The nurses suggested that qualification
to use the kit should include special training in emergency care. Id.
I.- See 51 Fed. Reg. 1218, 1220.
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petition1 39 and the notice of proposed rulemaking, 40 the
FAA concluded that an expanded medical kit on passen-
ger aircraft was needed.' 4' Although recognizing the de-
creased need for use of the kits on short duration flights
with limited numbers of passengers, the FAA nonetheless
concluded that medical emergencies requiring prompt
assistance might occur on such flights. 42 Hence, the FAA
requires carriage of the emergency medical kits on all pas-
senger aircraft operating under Part 121 of the federal
aviation regulations. 143
The FAA modified the contents of the proposed kit by
eliminating all surgical instruments and controlled
drugs. 44 The kits, as modified, must contain the follow-
1.1 46 Fed. Reg. 42,278 (1981) (proposed Aug. 20, 1981). For discussion of the
Bargmann petition, see supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
14, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,444 (1985) (proposed Mar. 14, 1985). For discussion of the
notice of proposed rulemaking, see supra notes 114-138 and accompanying text.
1- 51 Fed. Reg. 1218, 1220 (1986).
142 Id. at 1220-21.
1 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.309(d) (1988)(requiring emergency medical kit on pas-
senger flights). Air carriers subject to the regulation are as follows:
(1) Each air carrier engaging in interstate or overseas air transporta-
tion under a certificate of public convenience and necessity or other
appropriate economic authority issued by the CAB.
(2) Each air carrier engaging in foreign air transportation under a
certificate of public convenience and necessity or other appropriate
economic authority issued by the CAB.
(3) Each air carrier covered by paragraph (a) (1) or (2) of this sec-
tion when engaging in charter flights or other special service
operations.
(4) Each supplemental air carrier when it engages in the carriage of
persons or property in air commerce for compensation or hire
(5) Each commercial operator when it engages in the carriage of
persons or property in air commerce for compensation or hire-
(i) With large aircraft other than airplanes; or
(ii) As a common carrier solely between places entirely within any
state of the United States, with airplanes having a seating capacity of
more than 30 passengers or a maximum payload capacity of more
than 7,500 pounds.
(6) Each air carrier when it engages in all-cargo air service under a
certificate issued by the CAB under section 418 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958.
14 C.F.R. § 121.1(a)(1)-(6) (1988).
1.. See 51 Fed. Reg. 1218, 1221 (1986). The equipment and drugs eliminated
from the proposed kit include a tracheal airway set, hemostats, a scalpel, scissors,
an intravenous administration set, analgesics (morphine sulfate), antiarrhythmic
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ing: dextrose, epinephrine, and diphenhydramine (inject-
able medications); nitroglycerin tablets; a stethoscope and
a sphygmomanometer; three sizes of oropharyngeal air-
ways; needles and syringes (sizes necessary to administer
required drugs); and, basic instructions for use of the
drugs in the kit.' 45 The FAA reasoned that elimination of
the surgical instruments, controlled substances, and pre-
scription drugs minimized concerns regarding security,
the potential for misuse, congressional concerns regard-
ing the dangerousness of the drugs and equipment, and
liability for use of the kit. 14 6
The amendment also requires that crewmembers' train-
ing include "familiarization with the emergency medical
kit."'' 4 7 Finally, the FAA adopted the proposal requiring
carriers to maintain records and to report medical emer-
gencies annually for two years. 48
In evaluating the implementation costs of the amend-
drugs (lidocaine hydrochloride and atropine sulfate), sodium bicarbonate,
amobartital, diazepam, antiemetic drug (prochlorperazine), and adrenocortical
steroid. Id. at 1221. For the contents of originally proposed kit, see supra note
115.
14 14 C.F.R. § 121 app. A (1988).
. 51 Fed. Reg. 1218, 1221 (1986). The elimination of so many drugs and
medical instruments obviously represents a compromise by the FAA. The FAA
explained that the prescription drugs retained in the kits "do not have the same
potential for misuse or require monitoring equipment as do those drugs deleted."
Id. at 1221.
147 14 C.F.R. § 121.417(b)(3)(iv) (1988). The regulation for emergency train-
ing of crewmembers states that crewmembers must receive instruction in handling
emergency situations, including illnesses, injuries, "or other abnormal situations
involving passengers or crewmembers to include familiarization with the emer-
gency medical kit." Id. For discussion of crewmember training, see infra notes
188-208 and accompanying text.
'- See 14 C.F.R. § 121.715 (1988). This amendment states:
(a) For a period of 24 months commencing with the effective date of
this rule, each certificate holder shall maintain records on each med-
ical emergency occurring during flight time resulting in use of the
emergency medical kit required under Appendix A, diversion of the
aircraft, or death of a passenger or crew member. These records
shall include a description of how the medical kit was used, by
whom, and the outcome of the medical emergency.
(b) The certificate holder shall submit these records, or a summary
thereof, to its assigned FAA Principal Operations Inspector within
30 days after the end of each 12-month period during the 24 months
specified in paragraph (a).
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ment, the FAA estimated that the cost of equipping pas-
senger aircraft with emergency medical kits would be
$233,000.149 Further, the additional fuel cost per kit
would be $94.00.150 On the other hand, the FAA esti-
mated that the benefits resulting from emergency medical
kits might be a "savings" of two to ten lives annually. 15 '
Using these figures, the FAA predicted that 21 to 100
lives could be saved over a ten year period, with the ex-
pected discounted present value of lives saved ranging
from $8.4 million to $41.9 million.' 52 Thus, the FAA con-
cluded that the "estimated benefits exceed[ed] the esti-
mated costs of implementing this amendment."'' 53
Furthermore, according to the FAA, the amendments
would not have a significant economic impact on small air
carriers. t54
F. Results of First Annual Reports
The new amendment required each air carrier to main-
Id. For a discussion of the results of the first year of such reporting, see infra notes
155-168 and accompanying text.
-, See 51 Fed. Reg. 1218, 1221 (1986). This cost includes both the purchase
and installation costs and is based on an approximate cost of $100 per kit for 2333
aircraft. Id.
I.. Id. This figure was arrived at based on the medical kit's approximate weight
of seven pounds, which would result in an estimated average fuel consumption of
15 gallons per year per aircraft, at an approximate fuel price of 89.4 cents per
gallon. Id. The FAA further stated that the present value of the total implementa-
tion costs for the 10 year period following implementation would be approxi-
mately $5.9 million. Id. at 1222.
-1 Id. The FAA estimated that approximately 21 deaths occur in flight per
year, while the public estimates of in-flight deaths approximated 100 annually. Id.
The FAA then estimated that 10% of these deaths might be prevented by use of
an emergency medical kit. Id. Thus, a range of two to ten lives saved annually was
derived from the FAA's and the public estimates. Id.
1.,2 Id. The FAA valued a life at $650,000 in 1983 dollars for purposes of the
economic study. Id. The discount rate used in the FAA's calculations for the 10
year period was 10%. Id. Based on these estimates, the emergency medical kits
were projected to have a benefit/cost ratio ranging from a low of 1.42 to a high of
6.76. Id.
1- Id. at 1223.
154 Id. The FAA estimated that the annualized cost per aircraft to meet the
emergency medical requirements was $217 per aircraft. Id. As the FAA defines a
small air carrier to consist of a maximum of nine operating aircraft, a small air
carrier maximum economic cost would be approximately $1953 (9 x $217). Id.
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tain records for a twenty-four month period on each in-
flight medical emergency "resulting in use of the emer-
gency medical kit required under Appendix A, diversion
of the aircraft, or death of a passenger or
crewmember."' 55 In addition, the regulation required
each airline to send the records, or a summation of them,
to its FAA Principal Operations Inspector at the end of
each year.1 56 The Protection and Survival Laboratory of
the FAA compiled the records and prepared a summary of
them for the first 12-month period. 57 Although the sub-
stantive information provided by the airlines varied, mak-
ing accurate statistical analysis impossible,1 58  the
Laboratory's compilation and summary of the data pro-
vides useful information for the FAA to consider in any
future rulemaking.
The Laboratory report indicates that the airlines filed
651 individual reports, and two airlines filed report sum-
maries. There were a total of 1,016 in-flight medical
emergencies.' 59 The air carriers diverted at least eighty-
nine flights' 60 and eight in-flight passenger deaths oc-
mr, 14 C.F.R. § 121.715.(a) (1988). The regulations did not specify a particular
format for these records other than requiring "a description of how the medical
kit was used, by whom, and the outcome of the medical emergency." Id.
-,; 14 C.F.R. § 121.715(b) (1988).
157 M. George, Summary of Inflight Medical Emergency Reports, August 1,
1986 through July 31, 1987, Memorandum No. AAM- 119-88-2 (Feb. 12, 1988)
(available at the Civil Aeronautical Center, FAA, Oklahoma City, Okla.).
159 See id. at 4. The Laboratory noted:
The inflight medical emergency reports are informationally inconsis-
tent. Certain operators provided more than the required informa-
tion, while others did not provide even the minimum. In some
cases, copies of the attending physician's report were furnished, re-
quiring considerable interpretation in order to make data encoding
possible .... Since there is no requirement for uniform reporting of
inflight medical emergencies, the data in this study should not be
considered complete, and should not be used for precise statistical
analysis or projections.
Id.
1... Id. at 2. This figure is actually higher because Eastern Airlines' report of 81
occurrences of medical emergencies was not included in the summary due to its
failure to provide detailed information. Id.
1- Id. at 3. The data reflected 89 confirmed diversions and 628 instances not
requiring diversion. In the remaining 299 instances it is unknown whether or not
the aircraft diverted. Id.
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curred.16  Medical equipment used most frequently in-
cluded the spyhgmomanometer (739 reports of use) and
the stethoscope (734 reports of use).1 62 Medications ad-
ministered most frequently included nitroglycerin (used
100 times) and diphenhydramine (used 35 times).' 63 Per-
sons using the medical kit included physicians, nurses,
emergency medical technicians, and crewmembers. 164
Physicians utilized the kit most frequently. The figures in-
dicate 589 instances of use by a positively identified physi-
cian, and 321 instances where a physician probably used
the kit.' 65 These figures confirm the previous estimates
that physicians are aboard a high percentage of commer-
cial flights. 66
The types of medical emergencies occurring included
diabetic problems, cardiac problems, complaints of chest
pain, nausea, seizures, allergic reactions, lacerations, and
I- Id. No deaths of crewmembers were reported. If the report stated a passen-




I,- Id. at 4. The summary includes the following breakdown:
PERSON USING THE EMERGENCY PERCENTAGE
MEDICAL KIT NUMBER OF TOTAL
Physician 589 58.03%
Unknown 321 31.63%
Registered Nurse 61 6.01%
Emergency Medical Technician 22 2.17%
Licensed Practical Nurse 6 .59%
Other 6 .59%
Flight Attendant 4 .39%
Medical Technician 3 .30%
Flight Crew 2 .20%
Physician's Assistant 1 .10%
Id.
1,1 Id. Reports not positively identifying the title of the person using the kit
were included as "unknown." "In all probability, many of those included as 'un-
known' are in fact, physicians." Id.
See id. Here, physicians were aboard flights at least 58.03% of the time, and
perhaps as much as 89.66%. Id. For a discussion of previous estimates, see supra
note 73 and accompanying text.
syncope.'67 The frequency of use of the equipment and
medications in treating the illnesses indicates that the new
equipment has proved helpful in many medical emergen-
cies. Due to the frequency of suspected cardiac problems,
however, the FAA may wish to consider the possibility of
requiring external automatic defibrillators in the future. 
6 8
The FAA will presumably review the reports after the two-
year reports are filed to consider whether the inclusion of
additional equipment and medications is warranted.
IV. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Issues unresolved by the regulation include whether
"good samaritan" protection will be afforded the care
provider, who may use the kits, whether more extensive
training for crewmembers should be instituted, whether
the contents of the kits are sufficient for use in medical
emergencies, and an airline's potential liability under the
regulation.
A. Good Samaritan Protection
Good samaritan statutes typically relieve physicians and
other health care providers of civil liability for gratui-
tously rendering emergency treatment "in good faith" at
the scene of an accident.' 6 1 State legislatures enacted
167 See M. George, supra note 157, at app. C. Due to the variation in the de-
scriptions of the causes of medical emergencies, accurate statistics have not been
made. The compilation indicates, however, that syncope (fainting or uncon-
sciousness), cardiac problems, complaints of chest pain, and seizures may have
occurred more frequently that the other types of problems. Id.
1- See id. Some physicians have recommended external defibrillators as re-
quired equipment on commercial flights. See Litwin, supra note 71, at 1987. For
discussions of the use of automatic defibrillators, see Cummins, Eisenberg, Lit-
win, Graves, Hearne & Hallstrom, Automatic External Defibrillators Used by Emergency
Medical Technicians, 257J. A.M.A. 1605 (1987);Jaggaro, Heber, Grainger, Vincent
& Chamberlain, Use of an Automated External Defibrillator - Pacemaker by Ambulance
Staff, LANCET, July 10, 1982, at 73.
w-1, See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-I (West 1987 & Supp. 1988), which
provides:
Any individual, including a person licensed to practice any method
of treatment of human ailments, disease, pain, injury, deformity,
mental or physical condition, or licensed to render services ancillary
thereto, or any person who is a volunteer member of a duly incorpo-
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good samaritan statutes primarily in response to the phy-
sicians' argument that their professional duty required
them to render aid in an emergency 170 but that rendering
rated first aid and emergency or volunteer ambulance or rescue
squad association, who in good faith renders emergency care at the
scene of an accident or emergency to the victim or victims thereof,
or while transporting the victim or victims thereof to a hospital or
other facility where treatment or care is to be rendered, shall not be
liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by
such person in rendering the emergency care.
Id.; N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6527 (Consol. 1985). The New York law provides:
2. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of any general, spe-
cial or local law, any licensed physician who voluntarily and
without the expectation of monetary compensation renders first
aid or other emergency treatment outside a hospital, doctor's
office or any other place having proper and necessary medical
equipment, to a person who is unconscious, ill or injured, shall
not be liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sus-
tained by such person or for damages for the death of such per-
son alleged to have occurred by reason of an act or omission in
the rendering of such first aid or emergency treatment unless it
is established that such injuries were or such death was caused
by gross negligence on the part of such physician. Nothing in
this subdivision shall be deemed or construed to relieve a li-
censed physician from liability for [damages for] injuries or
death caused by an act or omission on the part of a physician
while rendering professional services in the normal and ordinary
course of his practice.
Id. A comprehensive review of good samaritan statutes and case law is beyond the
scope of this Comment. For further discussion and analysis of "good samaritan"
protection, see 2 D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 21.01-.60
(1988); Comment, Good Samaritan Laws - The Legal Placebo: A Current Analysis, 17
AKRON L. REV. 303 (1983); Note, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malprac-
tice, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1964); Annotation, Construction of "Good Samaritan"
Statute Excusing From Civil Liability One Rendering Care in Emergency, 39 A.L.R.3d 222
(1971 & Supp. 1988).
,1,, The Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association pro-
vide that a physician should "respond to any request for his assistance in an emer-
gency." See Note, supra note 169, at 1301 (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS ch. II, § 4 (1953)). Ordinarily,
under American tort law, an individual has no duty to provide assistance in emer-
gencies. Lee v. State, 490 P.2d 1206, 1208 (1971), overruled in part on other grounds,
545 P.2d 165 (Alaska 1976); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 340 (4th ed.
1971). If, however, one voluntarily renders aid he "assumes a legally enforceable
obligation to exercise reasonable care and skill in the task voluntarily under-
taken." 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 169, 22.01; see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). Thus, as noted by the court in Beasley v.
MacDonald Eng'g Co., 249 So. 2d 844 (Ala. 1971), "It was in recognition of this
common-law theory of liability - i.e., that one who volunteers to act though
under no duty to do so, is thereafter charged with the duty of acting carefully -
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such emergency care made them vulnerable to malprac-
tice suits. 17' The legislatures thus passed the statutes to
encourage physicians to voluntarily render treatment at
the scene of emergencies without fear of resulting mal-
practice suits against them. 17 2
Although good samaritan protection does not exist at
the federal level, all fifty states and the District of Colum-
bia have enacted such legislation. 73 The statutes vary,
however, with respect to the individuals protected and the
circumstances within the scope of coverage. 74 There is
no reported case involving a victim of an in-flight medical
emergency suing a physician for malpractice for voluntary
treatment. 1
75
that legislatures have passed the so-called Good Samaritan statutes . Id. at
847.
17, See 2 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 169, 21.01, where the authors
stated:
The recent and substantial increase in medical malpractice suits, and
the very real fear by many physicians of involvement therein, have
played an important role in persuading legislatures that the protec-
tion of Good Samaritan laws is necessary to induce physicians and
other medical care providers to respond to requests for assistance in
emergencies.
Id.
Id Id. "The basis for the enactment of such statutes is a perceived danger for
potential liability for malpractice would inhibit volunteering." Id.
17-1 See id. 21.01, 21.10-.60.
,74 See id. 21.10-60. Some statutes contain language exculpating "any per-
son" rendering emergency assistance from civil liability. For example, the Geor-
gia statute provides:
Any person, including those licensed to practice medicine and sur-
gery ... and including any person licensed to render services ancil-
lary thereto, who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene
of an accident or emergency . . . without making any charge there-
fore shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or
omission by such person in rendering the emergency care or as a
result of any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further
medical treatment or care for the injured person.
GA. CODE ANN. § 84-930 (Harrison 1985). A Georgia court of appeals held that
the statute applied to "any person" providing emergency care in good faith, and
thus a house owner who assisted a contractor's employee after he had fallen came
within the protection of the statute. See Wallace v. Hall, 145 Ga. App. 610, 244
S.E.2d 129, 130 (1978). On the other hand, the New York good samaritan statute
appears to apply only to licensed physicians. See N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6527 (Consol.
1985). For the full text of the New York statute, see supra note 169.
"' In most cases involving good samaritan protection for physicians, the physi-
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A review of the statutes1 76 and the "good Samaritan"
cases 17 7 indicates, however, that physicians and other
qualified personnel covered by the statutes who render
emergency treatment during commercial flight may confi-
dently rely on protection from the state statutes. Indeed,
the statutes which protect "any person" 178 rendering
emergency treatment, rather than limiting protection to
licensed physicians, should encourage other qualified per-
sons to assist when an in-flight medical emergency arises.
Whether good samaritan statutes will protect a
crewmember assisting in medical emergencies will de-
pend on the courts' determination of the airline's obliga-
tion to render medical treatment. Since courts require air
carriers to exercise a reasonable, high, or highest degree
of care for the safety of passengers, 7 they have an affirm-
ative duty to render aid to victims of in-flight medical
emergencies. Moreover, the new regulation arguably ex-
pands an airline's duty to provide medical care and assist-
ance.18 0  Since the statutes generally provide protection
for those who are not otherwise legally obligated to pro-
cians invoke the statute for their activities within a hospital. See, e.g., Burciaga v.
St. John's Hosp., 187 Cal. App. 3d 710, 223 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1986) (court held the
immunity applied to doctor responding to emergency call in hospital even though
he was acting within his specialty because he had no duty to treat the patient);
McKenna v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 282, 155 Cal. Rptr. 631
(1979) (good samaritan statute applied to physician who responded to emergency
in hospital because he was not on call for emergencies and he did not have a
previous physician-patient relationship with patient). One reported decision in-
volving a malpractice suit against a physician for rendering emergency care outside
of a medical office or hospital is Rodriguez v. New York City Health & Hosp., 132
Misc. 2d 705, 505 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1986), where the court held that the
good samaritan law provided immunity to the physician who voluntarily assisted a
building superintendent. Id. at 705, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
'76 See 2 D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 169, 21.10-.60 (listing each
state's good samaritan statute).
,77 See 2 D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 169, 21.01-.09 (reviewing
cases involving good samaritan statutes); Annotation, supra note 169, at 222.
,7. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 84-930 (Harrison 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:62A-1 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988). For the full text of the Georgia and New
Jersey statutes, see supra notes 174 and 169.
'17 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
I- See infra notes 235-240 and accompanying text.
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vide assistance, 8" crewmembers acting negligently may
not fall within the scope of statutory protection. 82 The
airlines therefore have good reason to ask for good sa-
maritan protection.
In response to concerns for good samaritan protection,
the FAA noted that such a federal legislative matter was
beyond the FAA's scope of rulemaking authority. 83 The
FAA stated that existing state laws "may apply" and that
Congress was considering federal legislation regarding
good samaritan protection. 84 To resolve the problem,
prudent state legislatures will amend their statutes to pro-
vide protection of airline personnel for their negligence in
medical emergencies. 85 Alternatively, Congress could re-
- See Lee, 490 P.2d at 1209 (the court stated that good samaritan statutes pro-
tect persons "who are not under some pre-existing duty to rescue.").
1"2 It is only in circumstances involving negligent conduct on the part of airline
personnel that airlines need good samaritan protection. Courts recognize that air
carriers are not obligated to carry elaborate hospital equipment or to provide phy-
sicians aboard flights. Courts only require air carriers to render such aid "as is
reasonably required by the passenger's disability and the existing circumstances,
providing that the carrier's employees know or in the exercise of reasonable care
have reason to know of the passenger's disability." O'Leary v. American Airlines,
100 A.D.2d 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288 (App. Div. 1984) (citations omitted).
Thus, a court should not find an airline negligent in circumstances involving un-
known or reasonably unanticipated medical emergencies. In those instances, the
statutory protection would not be needed.
1- 51 Fed. Reg. 1218 (1986).
184 Id. at 1221. The FAA stated, "It is not clear whether the Federal govern-
ment should provide this protection, or [whether] it is properly a matter for state
law. The applicability of state laws to personnel utilizing medical kits in an aircraft
during flight time is also unclear." Id. at 1220. Discussion of choice of law ques-
tions raised by the question of applicability of good samaritan statutes to person-
nel assisting in in-flight medical emergencies is beyond the scope of this
comment.
1q5 Cf CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557b (1987). The Connecticut good samaritan
statute extends protection from liability for ordinary negligence to specific indi-
viduals-such as paid policemen, ambulance personnel and employees of railroad
companies-who normally would have a common law duty to render aid in emer-
gencies. Id. The subsections applying to railroad companies and their employees
provide:
(c) An employee of a railroad company, including any company op-
erating a commuter rail line, who has completed a course in first aid
offered by the American Red Cross, who is trained in cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation in accordance with standards set forth by the
American Red Cross and who renders emergency first aid or cardi.-
opulmonary resuscitation to a person in need thereof, shall not be
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consider enacting federal legislation providing protection
for airline personnel and health care providers who assist
in in-flight medical emergencies.
B. Persons Qualified to Use Kits
The FAA has determined that each airline must resolve
who may use the emergency medical kits in light of each
medical emergency's unique circumstances. 8 6 The regu-
lation, therefore, continues to rely on a physician's or
other qualified personnel's voluntary aid in medical emer-
gencies. In order to obtain the maximum benefit from the
kit, the individual airlines should consider training at least
one crewmember per aircraft in regular resuscitation skills
or even to paramedic standards so that the crewmember
could, if necessary, utilize the kit in a medical emergency
in the event a physician is not on board. 8 7
C. Training of Crewmembers
The FAA regulations require that airlines train
liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal in-
jury or death which results from acts or omissions by such employee
in rendering the emergency first aid or cardiopulmonary resuscita-
tion, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity pro-
vided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions
constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.
(d) A railroad company, including any commuter rail line, which
provides emergency medical training or equipment to any employee
granted immunity pursuant to subsection (c) of this section shall not
be liable for civil damages for any injury sustained by a person or for
the death of a person which results from the company's acts or omis-
sions in providing such training or equipment or which results from
acts or omissions by such employee in rendering emergency first aid
or cardiopulmonary resuscitation, which may constitute ordinary
negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not ap-
ply to acts of omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton
negligence.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557b(c)-(d) (1987).
1- 51 Fed. Reg. 1218, 1221 (1986). The FAA stated that "resolution of this
question must be left to each air carrier since it depends, to some extent upon the
nature of and circumstances surrounding each medical emergency." Id. at 1221.
187 For further discussion of crewmember training requirements, see infra notes
188-207 and accompanying text.
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crewmembers in the proper use of first-aid equipment.'88
The airlines must also train crewmembers to operate the
emergency oxygen equipment.'89 In addition, the airlines
must instruct crewmembers who fly at altitudes above
25,000 feet on likely problems passengers may suffer as a
result of high altitude traveling.1 90
Under the new emergency medical kit regulation, the
airlines must instruct crewmembers in the handling of sit-
uations involving "illness, injury, or other abnormal situa-
tions involving passengers or crewmembers to include
familiarization with the emergency medical kit."' 9' The
FAA did not define what "familiarization" entails. The
FAA's remarks regarding use of the kit clearly indicate,
however, that the regulation does not require air carriers
to train crewmembers to expertly use the kit.' 92 Indeed,
comparison of the training requirement for first-aid
equipment'9" with that for the emergency medical kit' 94
reveals that airline personnel need not be trained in actual
14 C.F.R. § 121.417(b)(2)(ii) (1988).
14 C.F.R. § 121.417(c)(2)(i)(C) (1988).
See 14 C.F.R. § 121.417(e)(1)-(6) (1988). This section states:
(e) Crewmembers who serve in operations above 25,000 feet must
receive instruction in the following:
(1) Respiration.
(2) Hypoxia.
(3) Duration of consciousness without supplemental oxygen at
altitude.
(4) Gas expansion.
(5) Gas bubble formation.
(6) Physical phenomena and incidents of decompression.
Id. Significantly, the regulations apparently do not require that airlines train
crewmembers to treat these physical problems associated with high altitude flying.
See id. Instead, the language of the regulation appears to require only "instruc-
tion" in recognizing the physical problems likely to occur. Id.
it,, 14 C.F.R. § 121.417(b)(3)(iv) (1988).
-2 51 Fed. Reg. 1218, 1221. The FAA stated that "[t]he regulations do not
specify who should be permitted to use the kit. The FAA has determined that
resolution of this question must be left to each air carrier since it depends, to
some extent upon the nature of and circumstances surrounding each medical
emergency." Id.
u' See 14 C.F.R. § 121.417(b)(2)(ii) (1988) (requiring individual instruction in
the function, operation, and proper use of first-aid equipment).
.... See 14 C.F.R. § 121.417(b)(3)(iv) (requiring "familiarization" with the emer-
gency medical kit).
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use of the emergency medical kit. Instead, the FAA allows
airlines to continue to rely on "qualified medical person-
nel" to voluntarily render assistance and use the kit.' 95
Any additional or specialized training of crewmembers is
left to the discretion of the individual airlines. 96
According to representatives of several major air carri-
ers, first-aid training for flight attendants ranges from
four to twelve hours.' 97  The airlines usually provide
training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation with annual re-
fresher courses of one to six hours.' 98 Some foreign air-
lines have adopted a policy of advanced first aid training
for their cabin staff.' 99 One such airline trains selected
crewmembers to diagnose and treat commonly encoun-
tered medical conditions.2"0 This training includes in-
struction on the use of a semiautomatic defibrillator in the
treatment of cardiac arrests.2 0 '
Physicians have advocated that the airlines should con-
duct more extensive crewmember training. Some suggest
that the airlines should train at least one member of the
1..5 Id. "[T]he FAA believes that, in the event of an emergency, qualified medi-
cal personnel will voluntarily come forward, just as they do now, to provide assist-
ance and, when indicated, use the medical equipment and medication made
available." Id.
'!,, See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
11,7 See AMA Commission on Emergency Medical Services, supra note 82, at
1010.
' See id.; see also Mohler, Nicogossian & Margulies, supra note 70, at 920-21,
which indicates that "[t]raining in Basic Cardiac Life Support (including CPR and
obstructed airway clearance procedures) is given to flight attendants by most U.S.
airlines. Others provide it to certain flight attendants, but not all." Id. at 921.
One source indicates that T.W.A. instructs flight attendants and pilots in intro-
ductory aviation physiology and provides a one-day first-aid course. See Roden-
berg, Medical Emergencies Aboard Commercial Aircraft, 16 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED.
1373, 1375 (1987). Crewmembers are also taught to recognize common in-flight
medical problems. Id. at 1375. CPR certification is not required by T.W.A.
Training on "basic life support skills" is, however, provided. Id.
11.. See Chapman & Chamberlain, supra note 84, at 181 (British Caledonian Air-
ways); Preston, Death in the Clouds, 294 BRIT. MED. J. 374 (1987) (letter to the
editor regarding British Airways).




crew to paramedic standards 20 2 or to the level of emer-
gency medical technicians. °3 One medical journal re-
cently advocated additional training to operate an
automatic external defibrillator for situations of cardiac
arrest.204 At a minimum, physicians state that the crew
should be "fluent with resuscitation techniques. '"205
Whether the FAA should require additional emergency
medical training of crewmembers on United States air-
lines will depend in part on the final results of the two-
year reports submitted by the airlines.20 6 The information
in the first-year reports revealed that physicians and other
qualified medical personnel assisted in many of the in-
flight emergencies.20 7 On the other hand, a recent in-
dependent survey of in-flight medical illnesses revealed
that airline personnel provided medical assistance more
often than physicians.2° If the results of the two year re-
ports indicate that physicians or other qualified personnel
2-"2 See, e.g., Emergencies in the Air, LANCET, Jan. 5, 1985, at 28, 29; Mills & Harding
II, supra note 84, at 1205.
203 Cummins and Schubach, Frequency and Types of Medical Emergencies Among Com-
mercial Air Travelers, 261 J. A.M.A. 1295, 1299 (1989) (suggesting training to level
of emergency medical technician).
2-,, See Litwin, supra note 71, at 1987. The authors stated:
Early defibrillation alone, without intubation and without intrave-
nous pharmacologic interventions, may convert up to 50% of the
people in ventricular fibrillation to a life-sustaining rhythm. These
arguments suggest that training flight attendants to a higher skill
level to deal with emergencies and to operate the new technology of
automatic external defibrillators may achieve some success in resus-
citation of patients with cardiac arrest in the air.
Id.
Id.,,. See Emergencies in the Air, supra note 202, at 29. This medical journal stated:
In hard practical terms it is not the depth of the first-aid kit that is
important; rather it is the level of training of the cabin crew. Ideally,
one member of the crew should be trained to paramedic standard
but, as an absolute minimum, the rest should be fluent with resusci-
tation techniques - and that requires regular practice.
Id.; see also Rodenberg, supra note 198, at 1375-76 ("at least one cabin attendant
... should be certified in basic cardiac life support").
2111i For discussion of the two-year reporting requirement, see supra note 148
and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 164-166 and accompanying text.
,- See Cummins & Schubach, supra note 203, at 1296. The authors conducted a
one-year survey of emergency medical calls to the Seattle-Tacoma International
Airport. Id. at 1295. For medical emergencies occurring during flight, airline
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were not available on a high percentage of flights, the
FAA should consider requiring additional emergency
medical training of crewmembers. Evaluation of ill pas-
sengers by crewmembers trained in emergency medical
skills may reduce the number of unnecessary flight diver-
sions, and thus save the airlines the tremendous cost and
inconvenience of such unscheduled landings. Moreover,
additional emergency medical training of crewmembers
would ensure maximum assistance for airline passengers
experiencing in-flight medical emergencies.
D. Adequacy of Medical Kit
Another unresolved issue is whether the contents of the
emergency medical kit are adequate for use in commonly
encountered in-flight emergencies. As noted above, some
individuals supporting an expanded medical kit have
called for more sophisticated equipment and additional
drugs in the kit.20 9 The results of the reporting of medical
emergencies for two years, however, should enable the
FAA to reevaluate the equipment and drugs needed in in-
flight medical emergencies. 1 0 Indeed, based upon the re-
sults of the first-year reports, the FAA may wish to add to
the drug and equipment requirements to adequately treat
the commonly occurring medical illnesses such as syn-
cope, cardiac problems and seizures.2 '
personnel provided medical assistance for 51% of the passengers, whereas physi-
cians apparently provided assistance to only 13% of the passengers. Id. at 1296.
209 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 75, at 169 (reporting suggestions of ambu
bags, laryngoscope, endotracheal tubes, supplemental oxygen supply, large bore
needles, and external cardiac defibrillators); Litwin, supra note 71, at 1988 ("The
high frequency of apparent sudden cardiac arrest as the major cause of death
among air travelers suggests that the medical air kits now required by the FAA
would not be particularly useful during in-flight resuscitation attempts.").
-(, See 14 C.F.R. § 121.715 (1988). Prior to the adoption of this amendment, no
centralized or systematic recordation of medical emergencies on flights was avail-
able. The FAA noted that "[an analysis of the results at the termination of the
reporting requirement in 2 years will provide the FAA with information on medi-
cal emergencies occurring in flight so that any necessary changes can be made to
the medical kits, training of personnel, or related matters." 51 Fed. Reg. 1218,
1221 (1986).
211 For discussion of the results of the first-year reports, see supra notes 157-168
and accompanying text. The FAA may reconsider physicians' recommendations
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E. Liability of Airlines Under New Regulation
1. Liability Generally Under Federal Safety Requirements
As discussed above, courts generally require that com-
mercial air carriers, as common carriers, exercise either a
high or the highest degree of care for the safety of their
passengers. 1 2 In addition, courts recognize that a statute,
the purpose of which is to promote safety, as well as the
statute's implementing rules and regulations, impose a
duty greater than ordinary care.2 13 Hence, courts have
recognized that federal safety requirements do establish a
standard of care for air carriers toward their passen-
gers. 2 "  Further, courts have held that a violation of the
duty imposed by such requirements creates a private
cause of action, as long as the individual is one of the par-
ticular class of persons the requirement was intended to
protect.21 5
of including an automatic external defibrillator in flights. See supra note 204 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, the FAA should consider adding medications
including those to treat seizures, shortness of breath, unconsciousness and con-
gestive heart failure. See Cummins & Schubach, supra note 203, at 1298, where the
authors note that the results of their survey indicate that the kit may be inade-
quate to treat problems such as "seizures, bronchospasm, drug-induced loss of
consciousness, shortness of breath due to congestive heart failure, and the nausea
and vomiting of severe motion sickness." Id. Suggested additional medications
for the kit included an "antiseizure medication, an inhaled bronchodilator, an in-
jectable narcotic antagonist, a parenteral diuretic, and . . . a parenteral an-
tiemetic." Id. Another physician has made similar recommendations for
additions to the kit, including diazepan for seizure disorders, fursemide for con-
gestive heart failure, an "inhaled beta-2 agonist to relieve bronchospastic airway
disease," and haloxone for drug overdose. See Rodenberg, supra note 198, at
1376.
'-12 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
21. See generally Annotation, Liability of Airline for Injury or Death of Passenger Result-
ingfrom Violation of Duty Imposed by Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C.S. §§ 1301
etseq.) and Implementing Regulations, 31 A.L.R. FED. 270 (1977 & Supp. 1988) [here-
inafter Liability of Airline].
214 See id. at 284-85.
2 See, e.g., O'Leary v. American Airlines, 100 A.D.2d 959 475 N.Y.S.2d 285,
287 (App. Div. 1984) (violation of regulation not applicable because regulation
was intended to "promote safety of flight" and not to protect passengers from
consequences of their own consumption of alcoholic beverages); see also Liability of
Airline, supra note 213, at 280-81; cf. Manfredonia v. American Airlines, 68 A.D.2d
131, 416 N.Y.S.2d 286, 291 (App. Div. 1979) (FAA regulation prohibiting service
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In O'Leary v. American Airlines,2 16 for example, the court
recognized that the regulation in question which forbid
certificate holders from serving alcoholic beverages to in-
toxicated persons "serves to ensure the safety of the flight
and thus of the passengers who might be endangered by
the conduct of an intoxicated passenger. ' 217 The court
held, however, that the regulation did not aim to protect
intoxicated passengers from their own conduct 218 and that
the airline's breach of the regulation, therefore, did not
create a private cause of action for the plaintiff in this
case. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the plaintiff
could still bring a claim against the airline for breach of its
common law duty to exercise reasonable care for the
safety of the intoxicated passenger.2 9 Notably, the O'Leary
court recognized that under certain circumstances, the en-
abling statute or its implementing regulation can create a
private cause of action for injured plaintiffs.220
In contrast to O'Leary is Manfredonia v. American Air-
lines, 22 where the same New York court held that the vio-
lation of the identical regulation at issue in O'Leary
created a private cause of action for the plaintiff, who was
assaulted by an intoxicated passenger.222 The Manfredonia
court relied on Cort v. Ash, 23 where the United States
Supreme Court prescribed the criteria a regulation must
meet in order to provide a private cause of action.22 4
Under Cort, a plaintiff may base a claim on a breach of a
regulation if "(1) the regulation was intended to protect a
particular class of persons; (2) there was an intention to
create or deny a private right; (3) the right would be con-
of alcohol to intoxicated passengers construed as creating a private cause of ac-
tion for plaintiff who was assaulted by intoxicated passenger).
100 A.D.2d 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 1984).
2-7 Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
,-,1 Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
....Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 288-89.
22.. Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
22-1,68 A.D.2d 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d 286 (App. Div. 1979).
22 Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
22-, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
2-. Id. at 78.
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sistent with the goal of the statute; and (4) the cause of the
action is one traditionally left to state law."'225 The Man-
fredonia court found the regulation in question satisfied
each test and remanded the case for a new trial based on
the alleged breach of the federal regulation. 226
Other courts have also recognized a private cause of ac-
tion based on a violation of federal safety requirements.
For example, in Fleming v. Delta Airlines,227 where the plain-
tiff suffered injuries and an attack of angina pectoris after
the plane passed through turbulence,228 the court con-
cluded that the airline's conduct in failing to warn the
plaintiff of the possibility of serious weather disturbances
constituted negligence. In so holding, the court acknowl-
edged the statutory duty of air carriers "to perform their
services with the highest possible degree of safety. 229
Thus the court implied that the plaintiffs cause of action
was based on the defendant's breach of the statutory duty.
Moreover, in Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp. ,2'0 an action involv-
ing the death of a passenger in a mid-air crash of a com-
'-5 See Manfredonia, 68 A.D.2d at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (citing Cort, 422 U.S.
at 78).
2211 Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290-91. The court stated that the statute was
intended to protect the safety of passengers from the threat of intoxicated passen-
gers. Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.2.2d at 290. In determining whether an intention to
create or deny a private right appeared in the general FAA statute, the court re-
lied on 49 U.S.C. § 1506, which provides that "[n]othing contained in this chapter
shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies." 49
U.S.C. § 1506 (1982). The court construed this clause as affording a private rem-
edy. Manfredonia, 68 A.D.2d at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 291. Under the third Cort
element, the court stated:
The implication of a right of action is not only consistent with, but
also in furtherance of the goal of protecting the safety of passengers
and aircraft generally. If private persons are afforded the right of
action, the compliance with safety regulations by air carriers is en-
couraged and the regulations strengthened by economic sanctions in
favor of those who have been injured by noncompliance.
Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 291. To satisfy the fourth element, the court con-
cluded that the New York courts "should enforce Federal law in the area pecu-
liarly under Federal control." Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
27 359 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
228 Id. at 340.
22.. Id. at 341 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 142 1(b) (1982)).
350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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mercial aircraft and a military aircraft,"' the court held
that under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and its imple-
menting regulations, air carriers must exercise the highest
degree of care for the safety of passengers,232 and that a
violation of the duty imposed by the statute creates a
cause of action for an injured passenger.233 Thus, many
courts liberally construe the FAA statute and the regula-
tions and allow plaintiffs to maintain causes of action
based on an airline's violation of the statute or regulation.
2. Potential Liability Under Emergency Medical Kit
Requirement
Whether courts will hold that a violation of the duty im-
posed under the new medical kit requirement creates a
private cause of action for an injured passenger remains
to be seen. The FAA has stated that the intended effect of
the amendment "is to enhance the potential for diagnosis
and initial treatment of medical emergencies during flight
time. ' 234 A court could easily recognize a claim under the
regulation by construing it as protecting passengers from
the hazards of in-flight illnesses requiring emergency
medical care. Thus, under the court's reasoning in
O'Leary and Manfredonia,2 35 injured passengers faced with
lack of required medical equipment could invoke the gen-
eral enabling statute and/or the new regulation to assert a
cause of action against an airline.236  Even though the
FAA states that the airline can continue to rely upon the
voluntary assistance of qualified personnel in medical
emergencies,23 7 a court could construe the requirement of
2:1 Id. at 613.
"-'-' Id. at 614.
23.. Id. at 615.
51 Fed. Reg. 1218 (1986).
See supra notes 215-226 and accompanying text.
See O'Leary v. American Airlines, 100 A.D.2d 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App.
Div. 1984); Manfredonia v. American Airlines, 68 A.D.2d 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d 286
(App. Div. 1979). For discussion of the OLeary court's reasoning, see supra notes
216-220 and accompanying text. The Manfredonia case is discussed at supra notes
221-226.
,-:7 51 Fed. Reg. 1218, 1220 (1986).
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crewmembers' "familiarization" with the kit238 as impos-
ing an obligation on airlines to provide a higher level of
medical care. For example, in instances of misuse of the
equipment or medications, a court could find the failure
of the crewmembers to prevent the misuse as a breach of
the "familiarization" requirement. On the other hand,
where the airline fails to seek or render medical assistance
in a medical emergency, or fails to divert a flight, a plain-
tiff may not have a cause of action under the new regula-
tion. This may be especially true when crewmembers
allegedly fail to render adequate medical assistance, since
they are not trained in the use of the kit. 23 9 Nevertheless,
if courts interpret the "familiarization" requirement as
mandating a more stringent level of medical skill, a
crewmember's conduct in a medical emergency may be
held as constituting a violation of the "familiarization"
standard, giving rise to a private cause of action. Again, if
a court refuses to construe an airline's conduct as a viola-
tion of its duty under the new regulation, a plaintiff may
always assert a negligence claim under traditional com-
mon law rules.24 °
V. CONCLUSION
Prior to 1986, the FAA required United States commer-
cial airlines to equip their aircraft with only basic first-aid
kits for use in in-flight medical emergencies. 2 ' As a re-
sult, in many instances of serious in-flight medical emer-
gencies, airline personnel and volunteer physicians
aboard flights could not render assistance adequately. In-
deed, some plaintiffs suffering from in-flight medical
emergencies brought causes of action alleging breach of
the airline's "high" or "highest" degree of care for the
safety of its passengers. 42 Courts considering such ac-
2:.. See 14 C.F.R. § 121.417(b)(3)(iv) (1988).
239' Id.
2- See supra notes 19-67 and accompanying text.
241 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
2411 See supra notes 24-67 and accompanying text.
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tions allowed negligence claims against airlines based on
alleged failure to render adequate medical care or assist-
ance, failure to divert flights, and failure to obtain medical
assistance by contact with ground personnel.243
In response to a petition for rulemaking, the FAA
promulgated a much needed emergency medical equip-
ment requirement for all airlines operating under Part
121 of the FAA regulations. 4 The amendment requires
the air carriers to equip each plane with a stethoscope,
a sphygmomanometer, oropharyngeal airways, syringes,
needles, dextrose injection, epinephrine, diphen-
hydramine, and nitroglycerin tablets.245 The intended ef-
fect of the amendment is to enhance the potential for
proper diagnosis and the initial treatment of in-flight
medical illnesses.246 In addition, the airlines must report
annually for two years each in-flight medical emergency
resulting in the use of the emergency medical kit, diver-
sion of the aircraft, or death of a passenger or
crewmember.247 Results of the first annual reports indi-
cate that 1,016 medical emergencies occurred during
commercial flights, that the aircraft contained a high per-
centage of physicians, and that the physicians and other
individuals volunteering in the emergencies utilized the
equipment and medications extensively. 248
The new regulation left several issues unresolved, how-
ever. One issue of concern is whether good samaritan
protection will be afforded to persons rendering assist-
ance in medical emergencies. Good samaritan statutes
may protect individuals who volunteer their assistance
during in-flight medical emergencies. The statutes, how-
ever, may not protect the actions of airline personnel
2. See supra notes 24-67 and accompanying text.
244 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.309(d), 121.417(b)(3)(iv), 121.715, 121 app. A (1988).
For discussion of the regulation, see supra notes 86-154 and accompanying text.
24-5 See 14 C.F.R. § 121 app. A (1988).
246 See 51 Fed. Reg. 1218 (1986).
247 14 C.F.R. § 121.715 (1988).
2- For a discussion of the results of the first annual reports, see supra notes 176-
188 and accompanying text.
COMMENTS
since airlines have an affirmative duty to render assist-
ance. Therefore, state legislatures may wish to amend
their good samaritan statutes to extend coverage to air-
line personnel.
Another unresolved issue concerns who is qualified to
use the kit. Currently, under the ambiguous "familiariza-
tion" requirement, airlines need not train crewmembers
in the use of the kit. Instead, the FAA allows the airlines
to rely on volunteer physicians and other qualified medi-
cal personnel to utilize the kit. As a consequence of an
airline's reliance on the chance that medically qualified
personnel will be aboard flights, some ill passengers may
be without adequate assistance. To remedy this problem,
the FAA should consider requiring airlines to train
crewmembers to higher levels of medical skill. By training
the crewmembers in emergency medical techniques, the
airlines' potential liability would be reduced and passen-
ger safety maximized.
An additional unresolved issue is whether the emer-
gency medical kit's contents are adequate to treat com-
monly occurring in-flight illnesses. The first-year reports
disclosed that there were a significant number of sus-
pected cardiac problems, seizures, and episodes of loss of
consiousness. Based on these results, the FAA should
consider requiring additional equipment and medications
in the kit when it conducts its evaluation of the airlines'
two-year reports.
A final question concerns the effect of the new regula-
tion on an airline's potential liability. Airlines may per-
ceive the requirement as increasing their standard of care
owed to passengers. Indeed, courts may allow injured
passengers to bring a private cause of action based on an
airline's breach of the heightened duty imposed by the
new requirement. Nevertheless, even if a court refuses to
find that an airline's conduct is a violation of the new re-
quirement giving rise to a private cause of action, an in-
jured passenger may still assert a negligence claim under
traditional common-law rules. Despite these unresolved
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issues, the FAA's emergency medical kit requirement is
undoubtedly a step in the right direction, since the kit will
enable qualified medical personnel to diagnose and treat
many passengers experiencing life-threatening illnesses
during flight.
